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This thesis explores the influence of Islam in Turkey
today. Dealing primarily with Republican Turkey, the influ-
ence of Islam is traced through the development of the
various Turkish constitutions, through a brief study of the
political elite structure, and finally by looking at the
individual Turk.
Although Islam is being seen as slowly being eroded by
1 secularization-by-modernization, * it is still seen as a
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NOTES ON LANGUAGE AND TRANSLITERATION
In the interest of simplicity, use of transliteration
has been generally limited to proper names, except in cases
where a work or phrase of Ottoman Turkish or Arabic has
special meaning. In these instances, the transliteration
is used as found in the source material.
Additionally, different translators from different
periods have found rather diverse spellings of standard
terms to their liking. In these cases, too, quotes use
spellings as found in the source, while the general text of
the paper uses whatever seems to be in most common usage
today. Examples would be: for Islamic holy law, Shari'a,
Sheri, Sheri-eh, Sheriah, and Cheri; or for the Ottoman
Sultan, Abdulhamid, Abdulhamit, and Abdul Hamid.
Another problem arises with oz Tiirkce— the new 'pure'
Turkish written in the Latin alphabet. Generally, the
letters are pronounced in similar fashion to English with
these major exceptions:
c = j as in John
c = ch as in church
g = soft g, similar to running together the words 'I am'
o = the German o in oftnen
s = sh as in short
u = u in French tu or u. in German shutzen
i = varies from i in machine to u in radium
(Turkish has two separate i's—one dotted and one





From its beginnings, Islam has represented a comprehen-
sive attempt to fully integrate every aspect of society— from
government to hygiene— into the realm of religion. The
drift away from Islam in governmental affairs began quite
soon and has continued at varied rates in most of Islamic
world until the present day. More recently, however, an
upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism has been seen leading
countries such as Libya and Pakistan, and of course Iran,
to dramatic changes in their governments and a general re-
thinking of their positions relative to other Islamic nations
as well as the world at large.
Osman I (1280-1324) founded the Ottoman Empire as a gazi
,
or fighter for the faith of Islam. During the early years
of the empire, this spirit prevailed enabling the House of
Osman eventually to subdue the infidels up to the very gates
of Vienna. This rather aggressive brand of Islam enabled
the Ottomans to achieve a firm hold over the settled Arab
portions of the Middle East and gave them an excellent claim
to the Caliphate.
Although the position of the Sultan-Caliph as both head-
of-state and the chief officer of the faith technically made
the empire a theocracy, piety was not able to prevent deca-
dence in large measure and Islam eventually came to be more

a means of keeping Muslim subjects in line than a governmental
and social philosophy.
Arguments have been made in nearly all the Islamic nations
where an Islamic revival has been proposed that the end of
greatness coincided with a decline in piety. This argument
has been made in Turkey, as well.
Ataturk, on the other hand, saw Islam as an unproductive
relic of a bygone age and, as one of his earliest reforms,
he abolished the Caliphate (3 March 1924). This, coupled
with his numerous other secularizing reforms, served to set
Republican Turkey firmly on the path of Westernization.
During the early period of Westernization/modernization,
progress was understandably slow due to the world-wide depres-
sion and the Second World War. Because the spirit of the
reforms had ofttimes reached beyond the public sector only
superficially and because, as is often the case, crises often
prompt people to turn to spiritual concerns, there was a
popular outcry for lessening of state restrictions on religion.
To some extent, this was done by both the Republican People's
Party (RPP) and the Democratic Party (DP)
.
The economic success of the 19 50' s brought about by a
combination of Marshall Plan economic aid, membership in NATO,
and the general world-wide post-war boom served to increase
the pace of modernization and its bedfellows urbanization
and secularization. Like all good things, however, this
prosperity proved fleeting.

In most of the world the decades of the 1960 's and 1970 's
have brought unrest and some instability. In Turkey there
have been crises.
The first came in 19 60 when DP excesses proved too much
for the old elites and brought forth a militarv coup to
protect Ataturk's reforms. The second was Cyprus.
Turkey's problems with Greece over Cvprus were bad enough,
but when compounded by Western unwillingness to understand
the Turkish viewpoint thev multiolied. The 'Johnson Letter 1
(1964) , an ill-advised and poorlv worded slap- in- the- face for
a faithful ally, marked a starting Doint from which relations
with the West began to be seriously questioned. Followinq
this bv ten years, the arms embargo served to further cool
Turkish relations with the West.
Nearly simultaneously, the Arab oil embargo occurred.
Coupled with spiraling prices, this caused what may prove to
be irreparable damage to the Turkish economy. In addition to
the direct effect on the balance of trade, the embargo
—
through its equal effect in Western Europe—caused Turkish
gastarbeiteren to find themselves unemployed and forced to
return home.
All these problems served to emphasize the questionable
value of close alignment with the West and western methods,
and to heighten the sense of unrest among the populace at
large.

Again, crisis prompted some to seek solace from a higher
authority. Politicians, using religion as a vehicle for
gaining votes, openly pandered to the still largely unsecu-
larized populace—especially in rural areas. The National
Salvation Party (NSP) is a prime example of this. This
sudden interest in Islam differed from any previous ones
during the republic in that even government officials jumped
on the bandwagon hoping to gain mileage with their long- lost
Islamic (read: 'oil-producing') brethren, as well as with
the rural voter. Despite the outward appearance of use of
religion solely for domestic and foreign political gain,
the response of the voters to these ploys must be considered
evidence of some popular chord beinq struck.
The question then of this paper is: "Is Islam an influ-
ence in Turkey today?" By tracing historical development in
the form of law, elite growth and attitudes, political
parties and elections, and the sociological aspects of every-
day life, Islam will indeed be shown to be a force in Turkey
after more than fifty years of secular reform and westerniza-
tion.
Islam is seen as a power by the public officials who
co-opt it and by the politicians who attempt to exploit it.
More important, Islam is an inborn part of every Muslim Turk
whose parents, grandparents, etc. for nearly a thousand
years have been taught that Islam is a way— the way— of life,
10

II. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY
It is fitting for even a brief study of a nation's poli-
tical life to begin with the law of the land. With the
brief exception of the first period of the Ottoman Constitu-
tion (1876-1878) , until 1908 the alleged basis for government
in Ottoman Turkey was the Shari'a . In that year (190 8)
,
Sultan Abdulhamid II, in response to pressure from the Young
Turks, restored the constitution which he had earlier sus-
pended.
The next in the line of Turkish constitutions was a brief
and extremely general document dated 20 January 19 21. This
was followed in turn on 20 April 19 24 with the "Constitution
of the Republic of Turkey". This constitution was amended
on four occasions to incorporate the expanded realm of Kemalist
reforms and ultimately was rewritten in 1945 to incorporate
those amendments as well as the Latinized alphabet by then
in widespread use—at least officially—throughout the country.
Presently, "The Constitution of the Turkish Republic",
promulgated on 9 July 1961, is the basic law of the land.
In the following pages, points of continuity and change in
the development of the concept of constitutional government
in Turkey from the Shari'a to the present will be briefly




A. CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT
The concept of government in Turkey is that of a highly
centralized entity manipulating the many-lengthed strings
required to control the day-to-day functions of the state in
all its aspects. This is nearly as true under the Constitu-
tion of 1961 as it was under Abdul Hamid II or Selim III.
This concept of a strong central government has pervaded the
development of government-by-law in Turkey since pre-Tanzimat
times and has been strongly influenced by the nation's
Islamic heritage. According to Kemal Karpat:
The Ottoman concepts of government and authority,
strongly influenced by classical Islamic thought, had
been devised in conformity with the requirements of
power. The Ottoman rulers seemed to have a realistic
understanding of power and of the role of human groups.
The Muslim citizen was loyal to the state for it was
synonomous with his faith. . .Throughout the reformist
era, beginning with Selim III and ending with Ataturk,
governments in Turkey were extremely careful not to
tamper with those essential bonds which tied the
Muslim citizen to the state.
1
One example of this tendency to centralized control is
found in the area of vilayet (provincial) administration.
By 1808, provincial notables had achieved sufficient promi-
nence that one of their number, Bayraktar Mustafa Pasa, had
become the first of them to ascend to the position of Grand
Vizir. He, realizing the possible destabilizing effect of
effect of these powerful forces in the hinterlands, attempted
Kemal H. Karpat, ed. , Social Change and Politics in





to promulgate the Sened-i-lttifak (Document of Agreement)
.
Under this document, the Sultan would have granted a certain
degree of autonomy to the provincial notables, and they in
return would have pledged allegiance to him. Due to the
reluctance of either side to yield portions of their power
or privileges, the agreement went unsigned; but it does
represent the first formal document whereby the Sultan
2attempted to gain control over the provinces.
As time progressed, so did attempts at central govern-
ment control in the provinces. In 1864, a new Vilayet Law
was promulgated providing a quasi- representative form of
government; but it should be noted, the Vali (governor) and
numerous other provinical and local officials were appointed
by the central government. As the effects of this law
2For divergent views on the value of Sened-i-Ittifak
,
Cf Suna Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments and
Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 19 24 and 1961




and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the
Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey , vol. 2 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977)
, p. 2.
3
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey , 2nd ed,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968, 1968), p. 388.
13

became more widespread, local autonomy in the less remote
parts of the empire came virtually to an end.
Revised Vilayet laws came into being in 1913 and under
the republic in 19 29. These promoted the dual nature of
local and provincial government as being part of the national
governmental apparatus and as exercising local autonomy in
some areas. In practice, however, it seems that the major
officials are still appointed by Ankara (the 1929 law is still
in effect) and the purse strings are controlled from there
as well— there is still no ability to levy taxes below the
national level.
4One interesting aspect of this and other Vilayet laws
in the Ottoman Empire during the last half of the nineteenth
century is the composition of the various councils and
assemblies provided for. Muftis and other Shari 1 a personnel
were to be found as ex officio members at every level. Like-
wise, religious chiefs of the other communities were included,
In fact, in the annual General Provincial Assembly, each
Sanjak (major sub-division of a Vilayet) was represented by
two Muslims and two non-Muslims— a policy which would seem
guaranteed to provide a measure of over- representation to
non-Muslims in the Muslim provinces if the system worked in
the outwardly democratic form as published. Additionally,
at no point were the local governments below ministry level
permitted to tax or otherwise control the church or its
property—nor for that matter were they allowed to tax any
other aspect of their administrative area. Iraq, Ministry
of Justice, Translations of the Ottoman Constitutional Laws ,
the Vilayet Administrative Law, the Municipal Law and Var-
ious Other Laws (1921), pp. 35-48; and Lewis, Emergence ,
p. 388.
5






Equally an agent of control was the Village Law ( Koy
Kanunu) of 8 March 19 24 which through the extension of
administrative requirements enabled the central government
to impose itself even further on rural areas. This law set
many goals, but, by leaving their financial and technical
development to the villagers themselves, guaranteed limited
implementation while still expandinq bureaucratic control
gfrom Ankara.
In these laws there is some degree of autonomy for local
government, but in practice there is very little basic dif-
ference from ancient Islamic codes which failed to recognize
7
any measurable degree of local autonomy.
B. FORM OF GOVERNMENT
With a propensity to strong central government, it would
seem reasonable to expect the founding fathers of republican
Turkev to opt for a constitutional monarchy as more readily
adaptable to their present needs and past experiences. As
Bernard Lewis reminds us, the end of the First World War saw
the great monarchies in ruin while the long established re-
publics of the United States and France were strong and
Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Political Change in Rural Turkey








victorious. This lesson was not lost on Turkish elite of
the day. Probably of equal importance were the memories of
Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the Young Turks' dictatorial regime,
which promised dire consequences if the monarchy was restored.
Still another factor to be considered in this vein was that
the government of the Grand National Assembly had led the
Turkish Revolution—not been formed as a result of it. This
seemed to put government in a more positive light than in
many Western post-revolutionary states where government was
9
often considered a 'necessary evil'.
C. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
After the decision was made that the new Turkish govern-
ment' s form would be that of a republic, the next question
to be addressed was that of separation of powers—or more
specifically in the Turkish case, where in the government the
power would reside. The seat of power had been shifted from
time to time during the period of the empire and the most
recent of these shifts gave cause for concern to the framers




Killi, Turkish Constitutional Developments , p. 61.
Some authors feel the Quran (42-38) "... affairs are (decided
by) council among themselves..." is a basic exhortation to
Muslims to pursue a democratic form of government. Maulana
Muhammad Ali, translator and commentator, The Holy Qur'an ,




Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Selim III
(1789-1807) began the restoration of the power of the sov-
ereign. He, Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Abdulaziz (1861-1876)
all ruled more or less along the lines of Europe's enlightened
despots. In addition to these Sultans, there was also Abdiil-
mecid (1839-1861) , during whose reign the Tanzimat reforms
gained their main impetus—chiefly under the guidance of his
Grand Vizir, Mustafa Resit Pasa, who held the most powerful
position in the empire intermittently from 1837-1858. During
this period various reforms were undertaken, usually to
either placate or imitate the European powers. Although
these reforms (culminating in the Ottoman Constitution of
1876) outwardly provided increased individual freedoms for
the populace, they also served to centralize governmental
functions, reconfirm the ascendant position of the Sultan,
and thus increase central power at the expense of reduced
local autonomy in the provinces.
The Ottoman Constitution made provision for a bicameral
legislature (Art 42) , the sessions of which could be shortened,
prolonged, or terminated at the Sultan's will (Arts 44 and 73).
Members of the Senate were named by the Sultan (Art 61) and
for a law to be passed required a majority in both chambers
(Art 55). The Ministries, heads of which were appointed by
For a more thorough discussion of the Tanzimat period
and attendant reforms, Cf Shaw and Shaw, History , pp. 1-167;
and Lewis, Emergence, pp. 74-128 passim.
17

the Sultan (Art 27)
,
possessed the sole initiative for pro-
posing new laws or modification of old ones (Art 53)
.
Obviously, the Sultan was in firm control. As was stated
in Article Three of the Constitution:
The Ottoman sovereignty which is united in the person
of the sovereign of the supreme Kalifat of Islam belongs
to the eldest of the princes of the dynasty of Osman
conformably to the rules established ab antique .
H
As is clear from these and the remainder of the 119 arti-
cles of this constitution, there was very little attenuation
of the power of the sovereign during the reform period.
Rather, it actually culminated in a written reaffirmation of
that power to a degree in excess of that enjoyed by Ottoman
12Sultans for over two hundred years.
Later (1876-1909), Abdulhamid II took the reinforced
personal rule of his predecessors and expanded it into an
absolute monarchy of the most repressive kind. His actions
after suspension of the constitution are well documented
elsewhere, but suffice it to say here this repression was
one of the chief catalysts for the revolution of the Young
Turks in 190 8.
The Young Turks immediately set about to restore the
constitution—supplementing personal liberties as they did
"The Ottoman Constitution, Promulgated the 7th Zil-
bridge, 1293 (11/23 Dec. 1876)" American Journal of Inter-





so— and sharply curtailing the powers of the Sultan. As
they succeeded in expanding their control over the office
of the Sultanate (by now held by Mehmet V Resad) , they came
to see a powerful executive as being in their best interests.
By 1916, the Sultan's powers (as exercised by the Young Turk
leaders, Cemal, Enver, and Talat Pasa) had been re-expanded
13
and were once again considerable.
Thus, by the time the Turks were ready to consider change
to a republic, the country had been successively subjected
to increasingly powerful despots, a repressive absolute
monarch, and a dictatorial triumvirate— all exercising control
from the executive. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the Constitution of 19 21 (Law of Fundamental Organization)
stated:
Executive power and legislative authority are mani-
fested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly,
which is the sole and rightful representative of the
nation.
^
Additionally, this document began with the statement:
"Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation."
Although there may well have been little thought by many of
the delegates to the Grand National Assembly given to the
13Lewis, Emergence
, pp. 363-364.
Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, Art. 2,
p. 160.
15 Ibid. , Art. 1, p. 160.
19

16framing of a new constitution, these first two articles
delineate a clear break with the past. In 19 24, after the
Kemalists had managed to consolidate their hold on the nation,
a constituent assembly met for the express purpose of framing
a new constitution.
The resulting document severely limited the powers of the
executive branch of the new unicameral parliamentary govern-
ment. Despite these restrictions, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk,
from the supposedly weak office of President, managed to
exercise near-dictatorial powers until his death in 19 38.
Following Atatiirk, Ismet Inonu continued his predecessor's
strong presidency— especially during the crisis years of
the Second World War. The chief vehicle for this dominance
was the party structure of the Republican People's Party
(RPP) , which was virtually the only party for the first
17twenty- two years of the Republic.
In 19 46, however, an unusual event for a relatively
undeveloped country with a government of military background
occurred. The RPP allowed the formation of opposition
parties and subsequently, in 19 50, allowed itself to be
peacefully voted out of office. The ensuing advent of the
Democratic Party brought to light a basic inherent weakness








The Democratic Party (DP) managed, through adroit mani-
pulation of the Parliament, to dominate the Turkish polity
from 19 50 until the military takeover in 19 60. During this
period, aided by an overwhelming majority in the Grand
National Assembly, they amended the Electoral Law in 19 51 and
19 57 in such a manner as to ensure their continued domina-
tion of the government well into the future; but probably
their most heinous crime in the eyes of the old Kemalist
modernist elite was their regression from Kemalist principles
(ie: concessions to traditionalist and other groups in
Turkish society serving to retard or reverse modernization)
.
18This prompted the Turkish Revolution of 27 May 19 60.
If the voluntary relinquishment of power in 19 50 was
uncharacteristic of a developing nation, the military coup
of 19 60 was even more so. The coup was engineered by a
group of thirty-eight officers who constituted the Committee
ii 19
of National Unity (CNU) headed by General Cemal Gursel.
The unusual aspect of this coup was the goal of the CNU to
return the government to civilian control as soon as was
possible. Indicative of this aim was the establishment on
the very first day of the revolution of a commission to
18
Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments , p. 22-23.
19Metin Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of
the National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake




20prepare a draft for a new constitution. As soon as it
could be drafted, approved, and ratified by the people, the
CNU did, in fact, return the reigns of government to civilian
control.
The process of drafting, revising and gaining final
approval from the constituent assembly took precisely one
year (27 May 1960 to 27 May 1961). After this, it was sub-
mitted to the voting public who approved it (by a narrow
margin, considering the circumstances) ; and on 20 July 1961,
the "Constitution of the Turkish Republic" became the law
21
of the land.
Key elements in the new constitution were those which
modified somewhat the distribution of powers within the new
government. The legislature was still by far the most
powerful entity, but now there were to be two chambers 'with
different powers and terms of office..." There were to be
judicial guarantees and control for elections and the posi-
22tion of the President was enhanced slightly. Basically,
however, the powers of the chief executive were still
20Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments
, pp. 13-65.
For the composition of this commission, See Appendix A of
this paper.
21
Of the eligible voters, only 49.8% voted for approval
which shows a remarkable degree of dissent considering the
only way to get rid of the CNU was by approval. See Appen-
dix A for complete statistics on the votes.
22
Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments , pp. 68-69.
22

severely limited; and in line with the traditional power
structure of a parliamentary form of government, the most
powerful office in the land became that of the Prime
Minister.
That the legislative branch of the government was in-
tended to remain the most powerful is certainly obvious in
the new document. The President is elected for a single
term from among the members of the Grand National Assembly
(Art 9 5) . He then designates a Prime Minister from the same
body which has the right to accept or reject him. The
Council of Ministers was originally intended to come also
from this body, but debate over this subject resulted in
the appointment of non-members being acceptable (Art 10 2)
.
The Assembly, of course, was given the option of a vote of
no confidence at any time, enabling it to eject an unpopular
government government. The President was given the authority
to call for new elections (Art 108) after three votes of no
confidence—virtually his only power not strictly controlled
23by the Assembly. Senate actions also are dictated by the
Assembly. For example, if the Assembly rejects a bill the
Senate has approved, it is void. If, on the other hand,
the Senate rejects a bill already approved by the Assembly,
it goes to the committee. Also, length of debate on a bill
23
Ibid.
, pp. 128-129 and Appendix D.
23

in the Senate is determined by the period used for debate
24
on the same bill by the Assembly (Art 92) .
The Constitutional Court whose duty is to "review the
constitutionality of laws and By-laws of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly" (Art 146) is composed of fifteen members
chosen by and representing the military, universities, Grand
National Assembly, Countil of State, Courts of Accounts,
and Courts of Cassation. Although the Constitution charges
this Court with duties reading much the same as the U.S.
Supreme Court, it is interesting to note that the term is
not for life, and almost the only groups who are allowed to
initiate proceedings are the ones who appoint the members.
Considering the diversity of the representation and ability
of these groups to remove and replace members almost at will,
it would seem safe to assume the functioning of the court
suffers from the same problems as the parliament—namely a




This then has been the evolution of the basic form of
the Turkish government since the beginning of the nineteenth
century: ever- increasing power accruing to the chief ex-
ecutive, culminating in the repression of Abdul Hamid II
and dictatorship of the Young Turks; change to a Republic
24
Ibid., pp. 187-188.
25 Ibid., pp. 199-201.
24

with an all-powerful legislature which at first yielded its
power to Ataturk and later to Inonu; followed by peaceful
conversion to a true multi-party system which saw the legis-
lature's power abused by the Democratic Party. This re-
sulted in the military takeover in 19 60 and the subsequent
promulgation of the country's present constitution—again
giving the vast bulk of political power to the elected Grand
National Assembly.
D. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE
While questions of the form of government and distribution
of power were of obvious and immediate importance from the
Tanzimat period onward, another question of near equal
standing to successive would-be reformers was that of the
status of religion and its relationship to the state.
The beginnings of the move away from an Islamic state
could be traced to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920 's, or
to the Hatt-i Serif of Giilhane in 1839, or to the introduction
of the first printing press into Constantinople in 1727, or
even to the Umayyaids of the seventh and eighth centuries.
Whatever origins one gives this movement, one fact rings
clear— the move away from strict adherence to Islam in
affairs of state has had a good bit of time to bear fruit.
The problem has been one of projecting a national
identity to the people so as to provide them with an alter-
native concept to which to cling and to ultimately replace
25

their religion— not as a value system, but rather as a
source of a more localized identity. By 1961, Cemal Cursel,
as a part of the constitutional debates, was prompted to say
Go to a village in Anotolia and ask a villager 'Who are
you?' His answer will be, 'Thank God, I am a Moslem.'
He does not say, 'I am Turkish.' This consciousness
has not yet been awakened. 26
The problem faced by any Turkish government in attempt-
ing reforms is one of history. By 661, much of what is now
Eastern Turkey was under Muslim rule. Consequently, in
those areas, government programs face thirteen centuries of
local Islamic traditions. It must also be recalled that
portions of Eastern Turkey were only nominally under central
Ottoman control—even into the nineteenth century— so in




is not a formally codified law, but rather
an amorphous mass of opinion rendered by jurists, often
based on local conditions and nominally on the teachings of
one of the great juristic schools (in Turkey, that of Abu
27Hanif a) . Max Weber said of the Shan 'a ;
The sacred law could not be disregarded; nor could it,
despite many adaptations, be really carried out in
practice. . .opinions (of the Sheik-ul-Islam and his




Niyazi Berkes, "Historical Background of Turkish
Secularism" in Richard N. Frye, ed. , Islam and the West
(S'Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 19 57), p. 47.
26

are given without any statement of rational reasons.
Thus, they actually increase the irrationality of
the sacred law rather than centribute, however
slightly, to its rationalization. 28
He also states that secular courts* jurisdiction had been
brought to prevail in all matters except "...tutelage, mar-
riage, inheritance, divorce, and to some extent, settled
lands and certain other aspects of land law"— this as early
29
as the Umayyad Dynasty. In other words, by the time of
even the early Ottoman Empire, Shari '
a
courts had come to
function in a restricted range of civil matters only; the
exigencies of government having overcome the inflexibility
of Islamic law.
Why then did the Ottomans (and others) insist on at
least paying lip service to the Shari'
a
? The Tanzimat
reforms addressed many topics; but so long as the Sultan's
sovereignty derived from God alone, he could selectively
ignore them with virtual immunity. Islamic teachings
certainly supported this position with statements such as:
"man ishtaddat wat'atuhu wajabat ta'atuhu" (Whose power
prevails must be obeyed) . With such a base of support,
28
Max Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of
Interpretive Sociology , vol. 2, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus
Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 821.
29 Ibid., p. 822.
30Bernard Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events
in the Middle East (New York: The Library Press, 1973), p.
*2"9lT Cf also "obey. . .those in authority from among you' ( The
Holy Qur'an 4:59) and "He who dislikes an order from his amir
should withhold himself from opposition." (Maulana Muhammad
Ali, A Manual of Hadith , xxxi:3 and xxi:6, [Lahore: The




it is easy to understand a reluctance on the part of the
Ottomans toward change.
The Ottoman Constitution institutionalized the position
of the Sultan, not only as the supreme sovereign, as mentioned
above, but also as a sacred personage.
His majesty the Sultan is irresponsible:
His person is sacred. (Article 5)
Further, the constitution in fact required the allegiance of
all Muslims (not just Ottoman subjects) to "the supreme
Kalifat of Islam" (Art 3) and "the protector of the Mussul-
man religion" (Art 4)
.
There was, however, in this constitution what was pos-
sibly the first officially stated deviation from Islamic
law in Articles 81 through 91, dealing with the judiciary.
In these articles, criminal and civil courts are clearly
given authority over those responsible for Shari* a matters.
This, of course, is reasonable if one considers the fact
that the mere existence of a constitution served to replace
the Shari '
a
as the basic law of the land.
The Constitution of 19 21 (Law of Fundamental Organi-
zation) , composed in mid-war, did not address religion, but
its successor document was more complete. Article Two of
the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (19 24) provides
31,,The Ottoman Constitution", pp. 367-387
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a revealing chronology of the status of Islam in Republican
Turkey:
The Religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the Offi-
cial language is Turkish; the seat of government is
Angora. (Original version, 20 April 19 24)
The official language of the Turkish State is Turkish;
its seat is the city of Ankara. (As amended 10 April
1928)
The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist,
etatist, laique, and revolutionist. The official
language of the State is Turkish, its capital is the
city of Ankara. (Final form, 5 February 1937) 32
From these and other minor changes such as amending the
oath of office to delete reference to Allah, one can gain
an insight into the progress of Ataturk' s campaign to dis-
establish Islam in the public sphere. These minor consti-
tutional changes are only manifestations of the eight
principle reform laws of the Ataturk era:
1. The Law on the unification of education, 3 March 19 24
2. The Hat Law, 25 Nov 19 25
3. The Law on closing down of dervish convents and
mausoleums, etc., 30 Nov 1925
4. The conduct of the act of marriage according to
article 110 of the Civil Code, 17 Feb 19 26
5. The Law concerning the adoption of international
numerals, 20 May 1928
6. The Law concerning the adoption and application
of the Turkish alphabet, 1 Nov 19 28
7. The Law on the abolition of titles and appelations,
26 Nov 19 34
Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk
(Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 1939, 1939), Appendix D.
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8. The Law concerning the prohibition to wear certain
garments, 3 Dec 193433
All of these laws were legislated in order to reduce the
hold of Islam over the Turkish state and people. The first
was intended to put religious schools (medrese ) out of
business. The second and eighth dealt with garments associ-
ated with Islam (prayer in which the forehead must touch the
ground is very difficult in a hat with a brim) . The third
outlawed the historically fanatical religious sects which
had caused problems for centuries. The change of alphabet
and numerals served to slowly sever Turkish ties with the
Arab- Islamic world. Marriage became a civil rather than
religious affair. In general, these reform laws were de-
signed to vastly reduce the hold of Islam over future gener-
ations of Turks and to immediately end religious power in
the government. 34
Frederick W. Frey in The Turkish Political Elite says
the Kemalist elite of the early years of the Republic saw
the religious ranks as "Public Enemy Number One"— the har-
binger of their most formidable opposition. From the draft
of the new constitution in 19 61, one can readily deduce that
the status of religion as a major concern was still prominent.
3 3
Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments , pp. 201-202.
Lewis, Emergence
,
pp. 401-436; and Shaw and Shaw,
History
, pp. 3 84-3 88. One small item of some incongruity
is that although Article 2 established the state religion,
the Caliphate had been terminated seven weeks earlier.
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Before debate on specific articles was opened in the
Constituent Assembly (1961) , the floor was opened for
general comments. One of the most frequently discussed
topics was the need for accurate definition and protection
of secularism.
Several of the participants felt secularism was
indispensible for the protection of Kemalist reforms, and
that secularism, in turn "...needed constitutional pro-
tection because of the occasional eruption of reaction in
35the country..." This would seem to indicate that forty
years was insufficient time to change the minds of all
the people.
Article 19 (reprinted in its final form at Appendix B)
discussed "Freedom of Thought and Faith" , and provoked one
of the longest debates on any single article. It is in two
parts— the first guaranteeing freedom of religious belief,
and the second prohibiting exploitation of religion for
"political or personal benefit".
As innocuous as these concepts may seem, the uproar was
36
significant. Much of the debate was centered around the
need for state control religion with representatives both
35
Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments , p. 82.
36
For a detailed account of the debate on Article 19
,
see Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments
, pp. 98-104,
from which this section was derived.
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pro and con. Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP, gen-
erally considered somewhat right of center politically)
representatives were mostly in favor of relaxed state control
over religion, using the argument of Western secularism
wherein state and religion are totally separated.
The other side of the argument had supporters from across
the political spectrum. Because the Constitutional Commis-
sion felt Islam had been a hinderance to reforms and develop-
ment, they felt the state must be in a position to put
restraints on it. This was considered essential to promote
the rule of law and—especially among the rural masses— to
bolster a feeling of Turkish nationalism where there still
37
was none.
Enver Ziya Karal (Chairman of the Commission) is reported
to have said:
that Islam was not only a system of belief but also a
political ideology, and that nationalism replaced the
political ideology of Islam through the principles and
reforms of Kemal Atatiirk; however, this replacement had
not yet been fully realized. ^8
Maummar Aksoy's fear of a major resurgence of Islam is
recorded in this statement giving reasons why religion should
be subjected to state control:
37
As opposed to ummetcilik (the principle of living
within a religious community) which many representatives




38 Ibid., p. 103.
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If this were avoided, religion could transform itself
into a political force in the country; and this had
happened several times. For this reason, some had
made a defense of the complete separation of State
and religion in the so-called Western sense in order
to subject the State itself to the control of religion.
...it was necessary for Turkey (to control religion)
because religion in Turkey had always tried to infil-
trate the administration of the State and the political
life of the country. "
Whether or not this degree of near-paranoia was really
justified remains to be seen. In any event, de facto state
control of religion in Turkey certainly seems to exist.
Schools for Muslim clergy are run by the state, religious
education in primary schools is from state-authored and
approved texts, and the only office specifically mentioned
in the 1961 Constitution other than those of President,
Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, and the Judiciary, is the
40Office of Religious Affairs (Art 154) — it would seem
Mssrs. Karal and Aksoy got their wish.
E. SUMMARY
As can be seen from the preceeding pages, Turkey, in the
last two hundred years, has gone from a state nominally con-
trolled by religion to a nominally secular state in control
of religion. The government has gone from monarchy to dicta-
torship to republic; and control has gone from concentra-
tion in the executive to concentration in the legislature.
39
Ibid., pp. 101-102.
40 Ibid., p. 140.
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It must be understood , however, just as the form of
government at the top has not always followed the law of
the land, so laws made at the top are not always obeyed by
the masses. Indication of this is seen in the direction
of the debates in 1961—especially as regards Islam.
41
In the wake of the September, 19 80 coup, Turkey is
presently once again under a military regime and without a
constitution. As was the case twenty years earlier, the
military regime vows an early return to civilian government.
Also, as before, one of the first actions of the new rulers
was to begin casting about for persons to write a new con-
stitution— there was rumored to be a draft in existence at
the time of the coup. One further point on the 1980 coup
—
one of the first statements made public after the announce-
ments of curfew times and martial law commanders was to
remind the people that "Turkey is a Democratic Secular Nation."
Hurriyet
,
14 Sep 1980, p. 1. The influence of Islam on
the constitution of the third Turkish Republic, however,
remains to be seen.
34

III. ELITES AND POLITICAL PARTIES
As seen above, Turkey has undergone a systematic de-
institutionalization of Islam in the national political
fabric during the past century. As Turkish government has
historically been elitist in nature, these changes were
wrought by the elites and more often than not, for the
elites. In order to further the investigation of the effect
of Islam in Turkey, it is here necessary to pursue its
effects on the early elites and their successors in power
—
political parties and pressure groups.
A. OTTOMAN PERIOD
The functioning of the Ottoman state was governed by the
religious, military and bureaucratic elites—nominally, at
least, at the behest of the Sultan. The House of Osman
was a Gazi empire in the beginning with militarism and Islam
as its guiding lights.
Sunni Islam provided legal institutions, education, and
42
the tax system. The Vakif or religious foundations pro-
vided public baths and hotels, and the maintenance of streets
and water systems.







The bulk of the military which began as relatively un-
disciplined tribal armies seeking to garner booty while
spreading the faith gave way to a salaried force under
Orhan in the fourteenth century. After Orhan* s demise in
1360, Murat I began phasing out these forces and replacing
44them with the kapikullari or "slaves of the Porte". From
this came the Janissary infantry which would be a world
standard for infantry for generations and would endure for
45beyond its usefulness until its abolition in 1826.
The Ottoman bureaucratic tradition also began under
Orhan with the appointment of Alauddin Pasa as the first
46Vezir. As the Ottoman Empire grew and the problems of
administering it became more and more complex, the Sultans
ceded increasing power to the Grand and Lesser Vezirs to
the point of being only nominally in charge of the day- to-
day functioning of the realm.
By the advent of the nineteenth century, then, it was
these three forces— the religious, military, and bureau-
cratic elites—who for better or worse ruled the realm
—
often without the full participation of the Sultan.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman posi-







46Shaw and Shaw, History, vol. 1, p. 24.
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survival. On all fronts the armies of Islam were in disarray;
within the empire—especially in Eastern Anatolia— the
Sultan's control was, at best, nominal.
Selim III (1789-1807) came to power at a time when pro-
found social and political revolution was rampant in the
Christian West. What the modern military might of the
Europeans had wrought against the Empire was magnified by
the irrenigration of new thoughts of equality, liberty, and
nationalism—especially in the European portions of the
realm. To compound a bad situation, the once-feared
Janissaries had become soft, corrupt, and unmanageable,
as well as outgunned; and the Islamic hierarchy was adamant
against change. In this atmosphere, Selim began promoting
reform.
The most urgent target was the military. Unfortunately,
he was unable to overcome the inertial force of the still
politically powerful Janissaries, coupled with the religious
leaders of the Empire. In 1807, he was deposed.
A year later, Selim' s cousin Mahmud II came to the
throne and immediately his Grand Vezir initiated what would
have been far-reaching reforms. The conservative reaction
was immediate and fierce, and not until eighteen years later
was Mahmud able to truly begin modernization.
In 1826, Mahmud eliminated the Janissaries and set forth
upon a path of military, administrative, and social reform.
37

As he gained strength, the control of the Islamic function-
aries over many areas began to be overcome, semi-autonomous
valley lords and local notables were subjugated, and progress
in virtually every aspect of public life was seen. By his
death in 1839, there was a modernizing military with politi-
cal strength deriving from capabilities rather than tradi-
tion r and an ever-increasing class of educated persons
cognizant with the realities of the nineteenth century world-
able to initiate and administer reform. Although the reli-
gious hierarchy remained in positions of influence, its
authority was eroding with the secularizing influence of
western-style education, commercial codes, and military
reforms.
"The reforms of Mahmud II and his successors had created
a new administrative and governing elite in the Empire,
47literate, idealistic, and ambitious." Unfortunately, all
Mahmud 's successors were not as liberal as he, nor were
those who were inclined to reform sufficiently rapid for
the new liberals of the day. As shall be shown, Turkish
intellectuals, much as their counterparts elsewhere, have
never been destined to be satisfied with the pace of reform,
no matter how rapid. The upshot was the formation of
organized political opposition in the form of the Yeni
Osmanlilar (New Ottomans), later to lead to the Young Turks,
47Lewis, Emergence, pp. 150-151.
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the Committee of Union and Progress, and the destructive
triumvirate of Cemal, Enver, and Talat.
B. THE SINGLE-PARTY ERA
Although numerous organizations were formed to combat
absolutism and foreign influence (Vatan , Vatan ve Hurriyet
,
Ittihat ve Terekki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress)
and others) , their aim was generally directed at reform and
revitalization within the imperial framework. It is unclear
when Mustafa Kemal decided not only to reform archaic and
abusive methods in government, but to initiate revolutionary
change in the form of government and even society; but the
formation of the 'Association for the Defense of the Rights
of Anatolia and Rumelia' in 1919 served as the basis for
Kemal f s vehicle of legitimacy, the Republican People's Party.
During the Ataturk- Inonii period, the party and the government
were as one, and through it, all things happened at the
leader's behest.
At the time of Ataturk 's accession to power, there were
four elite groups in Turkey: the religious elite was reac-
tionary and generally in opposition to Ataturk; the bureau-
cracy supported Ataturk—especially so after it became
obvious he would prevail; the military delighted in one of
its number becoming the new head of state; and the intelli-
gentsia, after growing to a considerable size in the previous
century, considered Ataturk and his proposed reforms ideal
39

from their point of view. As indicated in the previous
chapter, Atatiirk made short work of the religious elite,
leaving himself with varying degrees of support amont the
cream of Turkish political society.
Despite their exclusion from formal power, the religious
hierarchy remained always the bogeymen in Turkey. Frey
referred to them as 'Public Enemy Number One 1 during the
48
single-party period. The extremes resorted to in order
to disestablish religion are instructive as to the place of
Islam in Turkish society and the depth (or rather lack of
it) to which Kemalist reforms managed to penetrate, and will
be discussed in the following chapter.
The military and bureaucracy enjoyed the prestige and
prequisites of power— the more so for the military due to
their role as a modernizing force of long standing. The
military also became the source of most of Turkey's leaders.
As in many developing countries, the military provided
education and opportunities for social mobility to the many
49
who would otherwise have been left wanting. Throughout
48Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 388.
49Nun Eren, Turkey Today- and Tomorrow; An Experiment
in Westernization (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1963)
,
p. 66; and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Elites and Modernization
in Turkey" in Frank Tachau, ed. , Political Elites and Poli-
tical Development in the Middle East (New York: Schenkman,





the single-party era, large numbers of deputies to the Grand
National Assembly have had military backgrounds. Up to the
present, every President of Turkey, except Bayar, has had
a military background.
Although former officers filled many administrative and
elected positions in Ataturk's and Inonu's governments, they
were effectively ' civilianized' by requiring resignation from,
and to a degree cutting off their contact with the military.
Ataturk made the Turkish military into the 'defender and pro-
tector 1 of civilian government, thus laying the groundwork
for future intervention which Perlmutter has said is charac-
terized by a "wish to avoid further political involvement"
50
and a hastened return of government to civilians. Tamkoc
on the other hand, is a bit harsher: "The political system
of Turkey, in fact if not in law, was based on the principle
of the leadership of warriors in civilian clothes who managed
51the affairs of state in authoritarian fashion. " Whatever
the verdict on military involvement in government during
the single-party era, it suffices to say it was major.
By the mid-1940's, when the single-party era was coming
to a close, a new political force had come into being. An
entrepreneurial middle class had finally begun to arise from
50
Amos Perlmutter, The Military in Politics m Modern
Times (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977) , p. 10 5
Cf ibid.
, pp. Ill & 163; and Scyliowicz, "Elites", pp. 32-33.
Tamkoc, Warrior Diplomats, p. 249.
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the indigenous population to replace the Greek and Armenian
merchants who had departed Turkey, by whatever means, during
the last few years of the Empire and the early days of the
Republic. This new class, being less encumbered by bureau-
cratic machinery, took away some of the monopoly of the
ruling elite over economic policy, especially in the urban
centers. Interestingly enough, Eren gives credit for much
of their ambition to the military service that brought these
52persons to the cities in the first place.
Before closing the discussion on the single-party era,
it is necessary to briefly discuss the 'other parties' of
the period. The Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party
was founded in Istanbul in 1919 and served as a front for
53
the Turkish Communist Party until its prohibition in 19 25.
In 19 20, Ataturk took a novel tack against this threat and
formed his own "Official Turkish Communist Party" and staffed
it with loyal military officers; but it too was done away
with. Although at first communism seemed compatible with
54
Islam to many of the uneducated, this was finally overcome
in conservative religious circles after a 19 21 'Fetva' from
52
Eren, Turkey Today
, pp. 66 & 109.
George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey






the Minister of Religious Affairs condemning it as "incom-
patible with the Koran". 55
A second 'other party* was the Free Republican Party
founded in 19 30 by Ali Fethi Okyar. Due to the massive
support the party received— including the conservative east-
and the riots attendant to its meetings, after only three
months this attempt at democracy was also abandoned.
There were other parties formed during this period, but
they were also shortlived and of little importance except
to re-emphasize a degree of unrest in the country.
C. THE MULTI-PARTY ERA
On 7 January 1946, the single-party era of Turkish poli-
tics came to an end with the registration of the Democrat
Party (DP) , which was followed in relatively short order
57by a veritable plethora of others. Virtually every one
of the new parties formed (approximately thirty in seven
years) advocated some degree of interest in revitalization
of Islam. These included the outwardly Islamic Defense of
Islam and Islamic Democratic parties which were more
55 Ibid., p. 93.
56Lewis, Emergence
, pp. 280-281; and Shaw and Shaw,
History , vol. 2, p. 382.





remarkable for their courage in the face of the still-in-
58
control RPP than for any contributions they might have made.
During this period occurred what has variously been
termed 'revival 1
, ' reformation' , 'renaissance', or ' re-
59
emergence' of Islam in Turkey. Reemergence seems the better
choice as there is ample evidence to show that Islam never
went away. In fact, with the beginnings of multi-party
politics, would-be elected officials found it suddenly nec-
essary to go to the voters and discover what issues would
rouse them to the desired action on election day. The DP
did this quite well, and when they went to the peasant
majority, the complaints they found were about government
neglect of agriculture and Islam. Using this information in
the party program— "our party ... rejects the erroneous inter-
pretation of secularism in terms of enmity towards
religion..."— the DP was able to do well in 1946 and win
60
quite handily in 19 50.
Although the relaxation of restrictions on Islam have
often been attributed to the Democrat Party, the RPP
5 Q
Howard A. Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish
Politics", Current History 32 #190 (June 1957): p. 335.
For three studies of this phenomena in the 19 50's
Cf: Reed, "Secularism", passim; Howard A. Reed, "Revival
of Islam in Secular Turkey", Middle East Journal 18 #3
(Summer, 1954)
,
passim; and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam
in Modern History (princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1957), pp. 161-205.
60Reed, "Secularism", pp. 335-336.
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actually started this move. During the period 1946-19 50,
while the RPP was still in power, religious education in
the fourth and fifth years of primary school was allowed
on a voluntary basis, and foreign exchange for the pilgrimage
to Mecca was made available to a number of people. Reli-
gious training schools were opened for Imams and Khatibs,
and additionally, a Faculty of Theology was opened in the
University of Ankara. Also, shortly before the 19 50 elec-
6 1
tions, the tombs of various sultans and saints were reopened.
The Democrats, on the other hand, amplified these changes,
and added a few as well. Notable were the removal of the
prohibition against the call to prayer in Arabic, and the
broadcast of Koranic readings on the state-owned radio.
Religious education also became mandatory unless the parents
c. 2did not desire it.
Numerous reasons for this apparent about-face have been
listed:
1. A "wide philosophic trend away from secular positi-
vism" in the Western world.
2. Conviction of the immunity of Ataturk's reforms
to Islamic reaction.
Sabine Dirks, Islam et jeunesse en Turquie
d'Aujourd'hui (Paris: Librarie Honre Champion, 1977),
p~. 132 n 1; and Smith, Islam
,
p. 185.
62Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey" Inter-




3. Need for a "moral and social force to strengthen
the community against external attack and inter-
nal disruptions" (ie: Communism)
4. Get the "fanatics and lunatics" with their often
unorthodox brand of Islam out of the business of
agitating the populace
5. Votes 63
Certainly the move to multi-party politics ensured that the
the last of these was not the least.
As the Democrat Party was formed by defectors from the
RPP, so too, it had its dissenters; and in 1948, the Nation
Party was formed, seeking a more revitalized role for Islam
in Turkey. Only five years later (12 July 19 53) , the party
was banned for illegal exploitation of religion and attempt-
ing to subvert the reforms of Atatiirk— from what data is
available, it seems the NP suffered at least as much from
64
not being in power as from ideological viewpoints.
While government began the slow transition from one of
elites to one of parties, the military and bureaucracy
found themselves severely neglected. The intellectuals had
deserted to the DP in search of greater liberalization and
more rapid change, leaving their former allies as government
employees but not a part of the government. To compound
this problem, the world (and Turkey with it) entered a
63 Smith, Islam
, pp. 186-187; Lewis, "Islamic", pp. 41,
46-47; and Reed, "Secularism", p. 336.
64Shaw and Shaw, History vol. 2, pp. 409-410.
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period of rapid economic growth, but government salaries
remained static. The prestige of these two groups fell
dramatically.
During this period of rapid growth, the DP's liberal
economic policies allowed the rapid expansion of the middle
class, and for the first time, this economic sector became
an important political force. The attitude of the old estab-
lished elites— that is to say the military and bureaucracy
—
toward these businessmen was that of superiors dealing with
re
'thieves with a vechtie'. The intellectuals also came to
feel that too much emphasis was being placed on gaining and
maintaining wealth rather than on needed reforms. When in
the mid to late 1950's the DP's maintenance of itself in
power began to be perceived as its primary political object-
ive, the intellectuals began to desert back to the ranks
6 7
of their former partners.
So as the decade of the fifties and the Democrat Party
drew to a close, the former in-group was on the outside
seeing their power, prestige, and economic status badly
eroded. At the same time, there were many real and imagined
abuses of Ataturk's reforms—especially in the field of







secularism— as the old ruling elites once more banded to-
gether for what they supposed to be the good of the nation.
D. THE SECOND TURKISH REPUBLIC
On 27 May 19 60 at 515, Col. Alparslan Turkes announced
over the state radio the overthrow of the government of
Menderes and the Democrat Party. The two main issues were
political freedom and religion. The result was to throw
6 8Turkey completely into the age of power politics.
The three elite groups who provided the impetus for the
coup managed to maintain a degree of cohesion long enough
to write a new constitution, but this was to be their last
coordinated action. The military of the CNU (Committee of
National Unity) apparently lacked a cohesive plan beyond
the ouster of the Democrat Party, and this divisiveness soon
69
manifested itself. At the same time, the CNU rather in-
delicately dismissed 147 university professors, thus alien-
ating their intellectual partners. Overlooked was the fact
that the CNU had also forced retirement of more than 5,000
military officers and had strengthened the University Auto-




p. 135; Karpat, Social Change , p. 232;
and Walter F. We Ike r", The Turkish Revolution 19 60-1961 ;
Aspects of Military Politics (Washington; The Brookings
Institution, 1963), pp. 8-9.
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appear not to have wanted the same standards applied to
themselves as to everyone else.
This and various other factors—both internal and exter-
nal— served to fragment the intellectual elite and reduce
their effectiveness as a single force. The intellectual
elite began to fragment over relatively minor nunaces in
political ideology
—
providing ideological backing for the
many parties that began to spring up. As the intelligentsia
72had provided the legitimization for the coup, now it pro-
vided a degree of legitimacy for every vein of political
thought, thus reducing its own effectiveness in politics.
There were two other disunifying factors in the wake of
the 1960 coup: The formation of a large number of parties,
thereby splitting the vote and making the formation of a
government a difficult task; and the emergence of interest





By the early 1960's, the perception of the Soviet
threat had been significantly reduced and as the world
moved into the age of detante, this became even more the
case. With this reduction of the external threat, inter-
nal cohesion began, as so often has been the case in the
Middle East, to deteriorate.
7 9
Karpat compares the intelligentsia of 1960 to the
clergy of the Ottoman period, and the declaration of a
group of professors in Ankara justifying the coup to a
fetva from the Seyhulislam . Kemal H. Karpat, "Political
Developments in Turkey, 1950-1970" Middle Eastern Studies
vol. 12 #1 (Jan. 1976), p. 358.
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The four major new parties formed in 1961 are indicative
of the divergence of political thought at the time:
Turkish Labor Party (TLP)—Marxist; formed by trade
union leaders; finally dissolved in 1971. 73
New Turkey Party (NTP)—middle of the road with views
nearly the same as the RPP.
Justice Party (JP)—direct successor to the DP; slightly
right of center.
Nation Party (NP)—well to the right; successor to the
party of the same name which had been banned partly
because of its pro-Islamic stance.
The elites had been characterized by their higher educa-
tional attainment than the public-at- large, but by the time
of the 1960 coup, educational opportunities had opened to
many. Certainly, the peasants had not achieved great heights
of educational attainment, but the literacy rate no longer
hovered at 10-20%. This increased educational level coupled
with vastly improved communications media gave a larger por-
tion of the populace a choice of political philosophies from
which to choose.
73This party was led by Behice Boran who had been listed
as a known Communist sympathizer by the U.S. State Department
as early as 19 48. Today there is a new TLP with approximately
the same leadership (Boran may or may not still be in jail)
,
but a slightly different name (Ttlrkiye Isci Partisi vs. the
older Turk Is Partisi) . This name change is because of a law
prohibiting the use of the same name as a previously banned
party. (Today there is a Demokratik Partisi whereas Menderes
'
party was the Demokrat Partisi) . The new TLP gained about
0.8% of the 1979 senatorial vote, up from 0.4% in 1977, as
compared to the original TLP's average of about 3% in the
elections of 1965-1969. OIR pro j . no. 4904 Turkish Commun-
ists and Communist Sympathizers Dept. of State, 28 Feb.
1948, pp. 13-14; Sabri Sayan, "Aspects of Party Organiza-
tion in Turkey" Middle East Journal vol. 30 #2 (Spring, 1976),
p. 187; and Gunaydin 16 Oct 1979, p. 1.
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Labor was never a particularly vocal force in the
leadership until the 19 60 coup. During the DP regime,
economic growth was both rapid and random. The speed of
growth attracted many peasants to the cities where squatter
villages (gecekondu ) began to spring up overnight without
benefit of public utilities or other planned social ameni-
ties. This was to prove socially very troubling, as will
be shown in the next chapter; but as long as new jobs were
being created and new migrants were available to take jobs,
the workers complained little and voted for the DP whom
they saw as the providers of these jobs.
Despite DP promises, there was no provision for collect-
74ive bargaining or the right to strike until 1963. Armed
with these new capabilities, Turk-Is (Labor Confederation)
75became a powerful force in Turkish politics. Their
organization and willingness to cooperate with government
and management has enabled them to both benefit their
members and exercise political influence beyond their
numbers.
Bulent Ecevit, "Labor in Turkey as a New Social and
Political Force" in Karpat, Social Change , p. 156.
7 5According to Karpat Turk-Is supported capitalism.
Karpat, Social Change
,
p. 274 n.3. According to Ecevit,
they supported state control. Ecevit, "Labor", p. 163.
76Official numbers show more than two million members,
with estimates about half that. William M. Hale, "Labor
Unions in Turkey: Progress and Problems" in William M. Hale
ed. Aspects of Modern Turkey (London: Bowker, 19 76) , p. 65;
Karpat, Social Change
,




DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions) , a
socialist group, was formed in 1967 by ex-Turk-Is leaders,
and was closely associated with the TLP until it was abol-
ished in 1971. its membership is minimal and concentrated
77
chiefly in Istanbul.
Prior to the 1960 coup, students too were not a major
political force, but became more vocal and impatient after-
ward. At the same time, the students, following the lead
of other intellectuals, also began to divide over ideology
as is still manifested today in continuous strife on the
nation's university campuses. Ironically, the strengthened
University Autonomy Law mentioned above has actually aided
J.V 4. 78this unrest.
As in most of the rest of the world, students in Turkey
rioted freely in the late 19 60 's; but where most incidents
in the West were against the existing order—especially the
administration of the universities, in Turkey there was the
added dimension of extreme left vs. extreme right. The left
was represented by Dev Gene which was closely affiliated
with the TLP, while the extreme right, with a strong Muslim
hue ("...if it had not been for the Islamic religion the
77
Ecevit, "Labor", pp. 174-176.
Joseph S. Szyliowicz, A Political Analysis of Student






whole country would have turned red"), was only minimally
organized at that time. The left, with some Palestinian
ties, resorted to terrorism and the military eventually
8forced the resignation of Demirel over this issue in 19 71.
It is interesting here to note the attitude of Turkish
students toward religion as found by surveys conducted in
19 66—or about the time of the beginning of serious student
unrest. Of lycee students surveyed who were preparing to
enter the Political Science Faculty, all felt religion was
necessary, but 12% of the freshmen and a quarter of the
graduating class felt religion was no longer necessary to
them. In another survey, 20% of freshmen, 35% of sophomores,
42% of juniors, and 49% of seniors rated religion of little
or no importance. This, of course, shows an obvious secu-
larizing influence of higher education. At the same time,
as many as 40% felt religion was very important. Interest
in politics and tendencies toward the left were more prev-
8
1
alent in those who saw little importance in religion.
Later, after the fall of the Demirel regime, a survey
conducted during the period 19 70-19 7 3 showed somewhat dif-
ferent results. In response to a question about what most





G. R. Field, "Religious Committment and Work Orienta-
tions of Turkish Students" in Human Organization vol. 27 #2
(Summer 1968), pp. 147-151 passim; and Leslie L. Roos , Jr.,
Noralou P. Roos, and Gary R. Field, "Students and Politics




interested them other than their studies and their jobs, 103
of 250 respondents (students from eleven different faculties/
universities) answered "religion" second only to "friendship"
(114). Politics came in fifth with only fourteen responses,
suggesting probably the majority of Turkish students were
8 2interested mostly in an education.
This interest in religion is further correlated by the
dramatic rise in popularity during the same period of the
National Salvation Party (NSP) . The NSP was found 11 Oct
1972 by Necmetin Erbakan who had been the founder/president
of the National Order Party (NOP) . The NOP had been founded
on 26 Jan 19 70 "...for the reintroduction in Turkey of the
religious values of the past" and was dissolved in 1972 for
being "hostile to the Constitution of the Turkish Republic..."
— specifically Article 19 (Appendix B) . The NSP evidently
struck some chords of favor with its campaign against mini-
skirts and foreign tourism, as it won forty-eight seats in
83
Grand National Assembly with 12% of the vote in 1973.
Despite reactionary comments by Erbakan during the cam-
paign, Ecevit had little choice but to bring him into a
84
coalition government. Erbakan's parliamentary immunity
82Dirks, Islam
, pp. 302-303 & 351-352.
83 Ibid., p. 140-141.
"We are going to suppress the system of interest in
banks" and "We are going to close the gaming and drinking




saved him from thirty-eight suits brought against him for
anti-secular propaganda and insults against the republican
g c
form of the state. As late as March 1978, Mr. Erbakan
was still the center of legal controversy as his fellow-
representatives were trying to get him prosecuted for ex-
86ploiting religion for politics.
In any event, many Western observers now believe Erbakan,
although not necessarily his party, to be politically bank-
87
rupt. This is probably due more to his unrealistic and
disjointed economic views and inability to get along with
nearly everyone in government than his religious views.
Whatever the reason, the NSP fell to 9% in the 1977 elections
88
and rose slightly to about 10% in 1979.
There was at least one area where Erbakan was found use-
ful to the state—courting the friendship (and hopefully the
oil and money) of fellow Muslims. Of course, since the oil
embargo and ensuing price hikes of 1973-1974, the government
85Milliyet , 10 Jan 74.
86Pulse #3682, 17 Mar 78
87
Manchester Guardian Weekly , 25 Feb 79.
88Hurriyet , 16 Oct 79, p. 5.
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has spent considerable time and effort in this pursuit.
In conjunction with this new impetus of Islam in government,
Lufti Dogan, in preparation for the commemoration of the
1500th year of the Islamic calendar, celebrated the "spirit
of Islam" and reminded the world that "Atattlrk. . . set... an
90
example for the Islamic world's independence."
Although both Erbakan and Dogan are members of the NSP,
this party certainly has not provided all of the pro-Islamic
statements in the past few years—even Ecevit has been re-
91ported to use the name of Allah in public political debate.
This notwithstanding, the primary exploiter of religious
sentiment for political gain outside the NSP today seems to
be Alparslan Turkes.
Tiirkes first appeared on the political scene in 19 44
when he and a group of other students and some professors
charged the government with protecting Communists. He is
listed by at least one source as being "nationalist and
racist" at that time and seems not to have changed much
Oft
From Feb. 1974 when Republican Turkey, for the first
time participated in an Islamic conference (Lahore) , to
improved relations with Libya, to construction of mosques
in Saudi Arabia, to publication of Korans for other Moslem
countries, Turkey has been actively pursuing improved rela-
tions with other Muslim countries with whom relations had
been minimal since 1923. Dirks, Islam , p. 144; Pulse #3655,
8 Feb 78, #3688, 27 Feb 78, #3669, 28 Feb 78, #3773, 28 Jul
78, etc.
90Pulse #3694, 6 Apr 78.




since. In I960, he was part of the military take-over,
but was dismissed when he became openly hostile to returning
the government to civilian rule. After returning from a
period in India, he began to organize rightist youth to
93
counter Dev-Genc and the TLP, providing them with military
94training and converting some into veritable fanatics.
More recently, Mr. Turkes, who does not like being called
names ("If anybody calls me a fascist or a murderer, I'll
tear his mouth apart" ) , has been the head of the pan-Turkish
95National Action Party (NAP) . He has been accused of in-
citing Sunni Muslims against the generally leftist Alevis
(a Shia sect) in the southeastern portion of Turkey; and
with slogans like "Turkey for Muslim Turks" , at least helping
9 6
to set off the Karamanmaras riots of December, 19 78.
E. SUMMARY
In this chapter we have looked briefly at the people
and organizations who are in a position to effectively influ-
ence policy in Turkey— the elites, the political parties,







94 Ibid., p. 250.
Christian Science Monitor, 8 Jan 79.
96 Ibid.; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 Dec 77.
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97there are no elites in Turkey today, but the military has
been considered an elite in Turkey for centuries and still
retains sufficient influence to be considered so. The pri-
mary reason for Professor Szyliowycz's statement appears to
be the extreme fragmentation of parties and the intellectual
elite after the coup of 1960-61. Also, since 1961 the pre-
viously poorly organized peasants and workers have become
more of a political force, consequently reducing the hold
of elite elements on the reigns of power in Turkey. Likewise,
the intelligentsia retains certain vestiges of its elite
status, but it is so fragmented, providing small elite
groups for every vein of political thought, as to no longer
be an effective force. Also, much of the intellectual
activity is confined to students who are more military than
academic.
The leading parties—the Republican People's and Justice
Parties
—
primarily concern themselves with legitimate con-
cerns of government, with relatively low-key pandering to
the peasants. On the other hand, the next most powerful
parties— the NSP and NAP— spend a great deal of their re-
spective political efforts directly appealing to the religious
feelings of their constituencies. As pointed out above, the
NSP has a fairly broad appeal while Tiirkes ' group tends to
97
Interview, 8 Aug 78.
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promote sectarian strife between the majority Sunnis and the
minority Alevis, advocating, or at least condoning violence
in large measure.
Although the two rightist parties do not command a large
following (together they polled just over 16% of the valid
vote in the October 1979 elections) , both the JP and RPP
have found it necessary to form coalitions with them in the
past as the JP has been forced to do again in order not to
force early elections. Politics have been so fragmented in
Turkey since the formation of the Second Republic in 19 60 as
to make the likelihood of a clear majority government without
one or both of these parties seem remote. If this is indeed
the case, religion will remain an issue in Turkish politics
for some time to come.
Now that the leadership and major interest groups have
been dealt with, there remains only one segment of society
to discuss— the estimated 73% who have only comparatively
recently become aware of their political importance; the
group that is still emerging from tribalism into the
twentieth century— the Turkish peasantry. This is the sub-
ject of the final chapter.
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IV. ISLAM AND THE PEOPLE
Islam, as far as the West was concerned, began to revive
as an issue of interest in the late 19 40 's and early 19 50 's.
As noted above, this period saw a considerable number of
9 8
articles on Turkey's Islamic 'revival. 1 In fact, Islam
never died to require resuscitation. What actually seems to
have happened was Turkey discovered multi-party politics and
politicians discovered religion.
Many social thinkers have agreed that people tend to
gravitate toward religion in times of stress and perhaps
99
away when times are good. In light of this, it would be
natural to find evidence of Turks turning toward a deeper
involvement with Islam during the war years and beginning to
drift away after the influx of Marshal Plan aid began in
the early 1950 's.
Reed has found an increased emphasis on Islam in Turkey
during the Second World War when many goods were in short
supply, most men were in the army, and for several years
See above p. 35.
Karl Marx, " Contributions to the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right: Introduction ," in The Marx-Engels
Reader , 2nd ed. , ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton
& Co. , 1978)
,
p. 54 and Pitirin A. Sorokin, quoted in Ted
Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1970), p. 312.
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there was a very real threat of war. The army even returned
Imams to units. This, of course, coincides nicely with
the theory, but the majority of the "Islamic Revivalists'
have centered on the period of Democratic Party rule.
If in fact, a sudden revitalization of Islam had occurred
to the extent some would have us believe, evidence should
have been readily forthcoming in the form of ballot box
success for the single-issue pro-Islamic parties. This was
not the case. The Democrats, victors in 19 50, did undeniably
appeal to the religious voter, but their party platform was
sufficiently broad to attract enough votes to win. Every
party did, in fact, attempt to some degree to attract votes
from the devout. This then, was the source of the 'Islamic
Revival 1 of the 19 50's— the politicians' quest for votes in
a free and democratic system.
This was the source, but the reason was the feeling
—
obvious to the politicians—of the Turk for his religion.
Religion has throughout history played an important role in
electoral politics— if only as a strong undercurrent
—
102
around the world. In a country where the government had
100Reed, "Revival," p. 231.
101See above pp. 34-38.
Philip E. Converse, "Some Priority Variables in
Comparative Electoral Research," in Comparative Politics ;
Notes and Readings , 5th ed. , ed. Roy C. Macridis and





been associated with religion to a degree such as was the
case in Turkey, its strength would seem sure to be residual
for generations. The key, of course, was the relaxation by
the RPP—controlled National Assembly of controls on reli-
gious topics. As Bernard Lewis said in 19 52:
The peasantry are still as religious as they have
always been. For them there is no question of revival
—
the only difference is that they can now express their
religious sentiments more openly. 103
By the time of Lewis' writing, the combination of
Marshall Plan economic aid, Truman Doctrine military aid,
and the general worldwide post-war boom was beginning to
have an effect in Turkey. As a result of this rapid growth
of prosperity, cities began to rapidly expand with villagers
seeking to improve their lot in life.
This migration to the cities inevitably brought rather
primitive peasants into contact with a certain degree of
modernity. As well, rather than being tied to the land where
forces were often well beyond his control, the peasant
found himself in a place where a degree of technology was
being used to promote the control of his physical and social
environment. The coming of improved communications and
association with a market economy reduced the peasant's
ability to explain virtually everything away as the will of
Allah. According to Kautsky, peasants find this "profoundly




upsetting." This, of course, was the beginning of modern-
ization— said to be nearly synonomous by some with seculariza-
tion— for many Turks.
This combination of a degree of emphasis on religion by
politicians and a gradual modernizing by some Turks continued
throughout the DP regime. Then in 1960, the military over-
threw Menderes and company and. proceeded with what Karpat
refers to as the 'defense of secularism' as the first issue:
The press reported fully the activities of religious
conservatives, but without arousing much reaction beyond
the small circle of dedicated secularists. The country-
side seemed to pay little attention to the intellectual's
secularist outcry, chiefly because economic issues there
had acquired vital priority. Politicians found quickly
that villagers and small town dwellers were not inter-
ested in scientific explanations of the origin of man-
kind or the universe, but in current matters. As long
as the virtues of Islam were not challenged directly,
the citizen would not be drawn into religious contro-
versy or rely on religion to solve all his problems.
The fact remained that the basic reforms were deeply
rooted in the social body and no group challenged the
secular character of the regime. ^^
By the mid-1960's Turkey had: gone through secularizing
reforms led by the national hero and founding father; gone
through a ten-year period of secularization-by-modernization;
John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modern-
ization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 95.
105Ibid., pp. 19-20.
106Karpat, "Social Groups," in Social Change , p. 265.
His footnote is also instructive where he claims "...various
intellectuals who claimed that religion was the most power-
ful issue in Turkey..." seldom visited the countryside and
when they did, attempted only to verify their preconceived
view rather than to perform objective research.
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and had been again subjected to a legislated secularization
by the military. Then in 1972, after a period of continued
economic growth (if not the degree of prosperity of the
1950' s) and some political instability, the National Salva-
tion Party was founded and the following year garnered
nearly twelve percent of the nation-wide vote. The 19 80
military takeover again began with a statement of the secular
108
nature of the Turkish state. What has caused this con-
stant need on the part of governments to periodically
reintroduce secularization and the seeming inability of the
Turks themselves to realize it?
Tamkoc was quick to point out: "No attempt was made to
reform the fundamental precepts of the religion or to reform
the belief system that rested essentially on the faith it-
109
self. The Islamic belief system then is all that remains.
The belief system as it applies to the individual Turk—not
in his groups but within himself— is what needs to be
addressed.
Harris estimated the 'prayer- rug vote' at about ten
percent in 1979—not great but it had been enough to continue
the NSP in and out of coalitions for seven years. George S.
Harris, "Islam and the State in Modern Turkey," Middle East
Review vol. XI no. 4 (Summer 1979), p. 26.
108Hurriyet , 14 Sep 1980, p. 1. While making a point of
their secularization, the new military government also
required female government employees to be modestly dressed.
Tamkoc, Warrior Diplomats, p. 100.
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Unfortunately, there seems to be no concept of a Muslim
•mind set 1 with which to compare that of the Turks— this too
being an undefined and possibly undefinable abstraction.
Certainly there are parallels one can draw between character
traits of the Turkish male and other Muslim males
—
quick
temper, fierce pride, the premium placed on strength, rela-
tionship with women and their honor, "us against them" atti-
tudes—but these might be a result of the Islamic heritage
or previous nomadic existence or several other factors.
The comparisons are certainly not clear and the study would
require an effort of great magnitude and many years duration,
For these reasons, the remainder of this paper will be
limited to a brief look at the way the Turk practices his
faith.
There are two predominant varieties of Islam in Turkey:
Sunni Islam, the orthodox faith at least nominally adhered
to by the majority of Turks; and folk Islam, generally
Frey offers some character traits for elites that
seem to apply to most Muslim (although not always Christian)
Turks. Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in
Turkey," in Political Elites in the Middle East , ed. George
Lenczowski (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 64-72. These can be
compared with considerable caution to Raphael Patai, The
Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), passim.
I say with caution because of the criticism Patai had taken
from some experts in the field such as Michael C. Hudson in
his Arab Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
p. 52.
111Except as otherwise noted, material in this section
is the result of observations, interviews and casual con-
versation during six months of travel throughout Turkey
during the period February-July, 1980.
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claimed to be Sunni by the practitioners but often with a
112
considerable number of deviations.
A. SUNNI ISLAM
Islam is 'the very foundation of society, 1 permeating
the entire fabric of life; political, social, and private.
Religion, state, day-to-day personal conduct and interaction
are intermingled throughout the Quran and Hadith. Although
this ideal integration has never been totally achieved
(except perhaps briefly in the time of the Prophet and the
four Orthodox Caliphs) , it has nevertheless served in Islamic
lands as a basis from which all else is derived.
The basis for all Islam of course, is the Quran with the
traditions and sayings of the Prophet utilized for clarifi-
cation and specific examples. Within this body of litera-
ture, the faithful are beseeched to do or not do many things.
The major of these have come to be referred to as the "Five
Pillars." It is instructive to observe the compliance of
Turks with these most basic tenants of their faith.
112
The Alevi (Shia) branch of Islam represents a small
minority of undeterminable size estimated to be between five
and twenty percent of the population. During several trips
to what are reputed to be primarily Alevi areas, no one was
willing to say he was in fact not Sunni. For these




1. The Five Pillars
a. The Profession of Faith
"There is no god but God and Muhammad is the
113Messenger of God." Practically every child born into a
Muslim household hears this from his first hours, it is
called to him from the minarets five times daily, its recita-
tion makes him a Muslim. This is the test of being a Muslim
and virtually all Turkish Muslims pass it. Its recitation
does not make the reciter a good Muslim, just a Muslim. 114
b. Daily Prayer
Islam enjoins the faithful to pray five times a
115day. The mezzin's call goes unheeded by an enormous
number among the city dwellers. In the countryside however,
it is not uncommon to see a person or group stop to pray at
Quran CXII: passim. See also Ceasar E. Farah, Islam
(Woodbury, NY: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1970)
,
pp. 103-104.
114 It should be added here that virtually no distinction
exists between the words Turk and Muslim as applied to persons
within the country. A person whose ancestors might well
have lived in what is now Turkey before the first Turk
arrived might not be considered a 'real Turk' because he is
not Muslim. In 1965, Frey in Elites
,
p. 144, talked about
the moral stigma attached to being a non-Muslim and there
is no visible difference today. In discussions with Christian
Turks who have lived in the country all their lives, as had
their parents, a statement like "Because I am a Christian
I am not really a Turk," is not uncommon. I have heard one
Christian referred to as a Turk, but the speaker said he
was definitely an exception. These observations are from
Istanbul, July, 1980. In Malatva and Erzincan it was, "We





the appropriate times. At the same time, there may be a
group of by-standers—most often young men
—
going about their
116business or simply standing around looking embarrassed.
The Muslim faithful are strongly encouraged to
117gather at a mosque for the noon prayer on Fridays. At
other times, circumstances permitting, mosque attendance is
considered a good and beneficial act, but is not required.
Prayers at these times are generally attended by elderly
and retired men who have little else to occupy their time.
Friday noon prayer attendance tends to vary
according to location and degree of modernity. In Bodrum,
formerly a fishing and agriculture town currently enjoying
a profitable tourist trade, total attendance has hardly
changed in the past ten years despite considerable population
1 I C.
It is possible to see elderly Turks in prayer on
trains, in shops, and at the side of roads throughout Turkey,
Most hotels have a mihrab indicating the direction of Mecca
for their customers. The key word here is elderly, however,
as one seldom sees a young man in his early twenties per-
forming the namaz . I have actually seen and heard a few
younger men ridicule their elders for praying in a public
place, although generally the standersby will respect the




growth and construction of at least four new mosques. 118
Sahmuratli, on the other hand, is a small central Anatolian
farming community with a single recently-built mosque and
near universal attendance on Fridays and during holidays.
One cause of this lower attendance at Friday
mosque of course, is Ataturk ' s realignment of the Turkish
week with that of the western world for business purposes,
thus requiring public offices to remain open on Friday. In
the larger cities with a great deal of international commerce,
people have found it more convenient to be open on Fridays.
This results in very few city businesses being closed, thus
reducing the number of people available for attendance at
the noon sermon.
Ankara, despite being the capital, is more rural
than either Isanbul or Izmir. As a result, many workers
118Bodrum went from 5,000 to 8,000 population from 19 6 5
to 1979. On 8 Feb 1980, the attendance at the 'new' mosque
of Mansur's study was under forty as compared with the appro-
ximate 100 who normally attended in the entire town in 1969.
The Friday market showed no signs of reduction in trade de-
spite the presence of the mosque on the same square. The
hundreds of people milling about were virtually all Turks as
the tourist season had not yet begun. Fatma Mansur, Bodrum ;
a Town in the Aegean (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972)
, pp. 98-114
119
In Sahmuratli, the villagers are extremely proud of
their new mosque, constructed entirely with their own money
and labor. The secularly-educated school teacher said it
was filled on Fridays and for religious holidays, with late-
comers being left to pray in the courtyard. Interview,
Sahmuratli, Yozgat Province, 27 May 1980. This was also
found to be true by Szyliowicz in Erdemli when it was still
a very rural area. Szyliowicz, Erdemli , p. 102.
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have a more recent peasant background than their counterparts
in the other cities. Ataturk moved the capital of his secu-
lar republic to Ankara to escape the imperial and religious
trappings of Istanbul. Now in apparent contradiction,
Istanbul is probably the most secular city in Turkey while
in Ankara Islam is much more strictly observed. The main
maintenance facility supporting the US military presence in
the city of Ankara provides a bus every Friday for the noon
sermon, and every Friday it is filled with better than fifty
percent of the workers.
c. The Giving of Alms
121The faithful are told to help the poor.
Occasionally one will see an obviously poor man searching
for change for a five lira coin ($1=80 lira) to give a lira
to a beggar who is worse off. More often, one will see
obviously wealthier people avoid a beggar or order him away.
There is generally more hospitality among the peasants than
among the wealthy who often expect a return on any invest-
ments they make, no matter how small.
d. Keeping the Fast of Ramazan
The month of Ramazan on the Islamic calendar is
122
dedicated to a month- long fast during the daylight hours.
1 on
The fact that the workers do not get any extra time
off for this exercise (eg: they must return to work for the






It is possible to see entire families, parts of families, or
none of the members of a family observing this fast. As the
number of street vendors and open restaurants does not dimi-
nish noticeably during Ramazan (at least in Istanbul) , it
would seem to suggest very little decline in the number of
patrons. In the countryside, however, the propensity to
follow the fast seems to be greater. Participation for the
123peasants has been estimated at greater than 9 5%. Ankara
has been estimated to have thirty to fifty percent of the
population who fast, while Istanbul is considered to be much
124less (possibly less than ten percent) . In §ahmuratli,
both the hoca and the schoolteacher said the fast was
125generally adherred to throughout the area.
e. The Pilgrimage
The Pilgrimage (Hac ) to Mecca is a requirement
126
for those who can afford it. Making the Hac is quite a
prestigious event in rural Turkey. Those who have completed
it are generally revered by their peers and become a source
-1 «
-J II II !l
Interview with Dogan ycucu, Defense Ministry official
from Ankara, Izmir, 15 Feb 1980.
124 ibid.





of pride to their relatives. Despite this good feeling
toward the Haci, many people show no desire to go themselves.
They plead economic woes in the presence of their Haci
relatives, but often privately say they feel no real need
for it.
2. Right Actions
Other than the "Five Pillars," there are also a
great number of "right actions" and "forbidden acts" given
to believers as more or less mandatory guidelines of conduct.
A few of these follow.
The good Muslim is enjoined to honor and respect
128his parents. Past researchers have found this to be a
129common trait of junior family members. Today the pattern
is much the same. Seldom will a younger member of a family
127Because of the state of the Turkish economy, most
persons cannot financially afford to go. Foreign currency
restrictions on the part of the government were such until a
few years ago as to make the Hac practically impossible.
Between 1974 and 1977 these restrictions were eased so as to
allow the faithful who so desired to make one pilgrimage in
their lifetimes. Harris, "Islam," p. 25.
128Quran XVII: 23-24.
129
Paul J. Magnanella, "Aspects of Kinship Change in a
Modernizing Turkish Town," Human Organization , vol. 31,
no. 4 (winter 1972)
, p. 364; Sterling, Village , p. 101. On
this subject Sterling mentions many rules of conduct between
father and son. Although Sterling was writing of 19 50, many
of the rules still apply to varying degrees (ie: not smoking
in the father's presence and almost universal deference to
the father's opinion is still common. Interview with Esat
Naiboglu, Istanbul, March, 1980). Fathers still select the
son's bride in some places, as well. Interview, Malatya,
5 March 19 80.
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openly dispute his parents in their presence. A son will
rarely smoke or drink in his father's presence until after
he has left home to start a separate life of his own. In-
stances have been documented where young family members
(male) have left home to avoid disrespect to parents— there
being no mechanism for rational conflict resolution within
the family. 130
The Quran forbids the eating of pork, the drinking
of intoxicants (generally interpretted to include smoking
cigarettes, etc.), and gambling. Virtually no one eats
132pork. Drinking, smoking and gambling, on the other hand,
are a different story.
Wine, beer, and raki (a relative of anisette) are
readily available in all cities and towns and in larger
villages. The incidence of severe abuse is not great, but
a large percentage of the male (and much of the more western-
ized female) population does in fact embibe. Smoking is a
pastime for an extremely large segment of the population.
Kemal H. Karpat, The Gecekondut Rural Migration and
Urbanization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19 76)
,
p. 27.
131Quran II: 173 (pork) ; V: 90 (intoxicants and gambling)
132
It should be noted that the summer heat and dryness
in much of Turkey (as in most of the Muslim world) effect-
ively prohibits the raising of swine. Also, the lack of
refrigeration in much of the country along with frequent
power outages makes the likelihood of diseases associated
with pork a very real threat. For these reasons, it can
be reasonably assumed that even without its prohibition,
little pork could be consumed in Turkey.
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In the tea houses ( cayhane ) a veritable fog of acrid smoke
hangs every evening. During time of shortage, it is not
uncommon to see long lines of men, women and children waiting
133in a freezing rain to buy cigarettes.
Gambling, in an organized sense, does not appear to
be widespread. There are casinos in the major tourist cities,
but these are generally only for tourists as very few Turks
could ever afford them.
Small-scale private gambling does exist, however,
and virtually every cayhane has several game sets of various
types which may be used for this purpose. This does not
seem to be a major social disease, but rather a form of
recreation. Still, it is strictly forbidden in the Quran.
Another area of specific prohibition in the Quran is
134
usury—expanded by most Muslims to include all interest.
Although Mansur found a few incidents of people foregoing
interest as a religious principle, it was a definite minor-
ity in Bodrum—and during a period of general prosperity, as
135
well. No reliable figures are available today on a
1 33
During January and February, 1980, there were severe
cigarette shortages due to strikes. At that time, a cayhane
or office could be emptied in a matter of seconds by the
rumor of a shop having cigarettes for sale. It was not un-
usual to see school-age children, sent by their parents,
standing in line in snow, ice, and rain, waiting to buy a
single pack.
134Quran II: 275; III: 129.
13 5
Mansur, Bodrum, p. 69.
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nationwide or even local basis, but considering the unemploy-
ment rate of 25 percent, and inflation approaching three
figures, it is difficult to imagine anyone with enough money
to need a savings account being willing to give up the 4 4.5%
13 6interest currently being offered.
Banks in Turkey have certainly not taken up the
practice now prevalent in some Arab countries (notably
Saudi Arabia) of not charging interest, but rather sharing
in profits—unfortunately there are too few profit-making
137
ventures in Turkey today for this.
One evening in Rize on the eastern Black Sea coast,
during a discussion with two mid- level executives, the topic
of non-compliance with the edicts of Islam brought the
following response: "As long as we believe there is but one
God and that Muhammad is His Prophet and we don't do any-
thing to hurt others, we will go to heaven." They said they
could freely disobey the do's and don'ts as long as they
hurt no one but themselves. It should also be noted that
they considered themselves and the other residents of the
138
area to be much more religious than in the large cities.
136Hurriyet , 4 Sept 1980, pp. 7 & 15.
137 T,.,Ibid.
J" 38 Interview, CAY-KUR Arastirma Enstitusu, Rize,
2 June 19 80.
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Above we have seen how some of the basic requirements
of Islam are adhered to while others are not. This, of
course, resembles the behavior found in most societies
—
namely, men being aligned with a certain value system as
long as it is convenient and serves their immediate purposes.
As for the "Five Pillars," except for the expensive
Hac, most Turks participate in the rites at some time in
their lives, but few in the cities could be called devout
practitioners of their faith.
B. FOLK ISLAM
Islam, with no official clergy, places a strong premium
on the believer's ability to read Arabic. Prior to the
conversion to Latin script, Turkish shared for the main part
a common alphabet with Arabic, and so allowed the literate
to at least pronounce the words of the Quran. Since the
change of alphabet, even this ability has been largely lost,
leaving the Turkish people almost universally illiterate as
regards their religion.
In such a situation as this, where the chief source of
a religion is in a foreign language, that religion can only
be a strong influence in a 'folk' sense, having as many
different variations as there are teachers.
More recently, the disestablishment of Islam as the
state religion during the early Republican period led to
even greater heterodoxy. When Atatiirk put an end to the
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Caliphate and all the other religious trappings of the
Ottoman Empire and then later reformed the language, he
successfully cut the people off—not from their religion,
but rather from a factual knowledge of it.
Essentially, prior to the reinstitution of religious
education in 1946, an entire generation was cut off from
any open association with people who had had formal reli-
gious training. After the reinstitution of religious educa-
tion in 19 46, and later under the DP, people who were appointed
by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to local religious
posts, especially in smaller villages, were often poorly
qualified. Several instances have been recorded of reli-
gious teachers having sufficient knowledge of Arabic script
to be able to read the Quran, but without understanding the
139
words 1 meanings.
Lacking both knowledgeable teachers and the ability to
read the Quran for themselves, strict observance of the
more subtle points of Islam could reasonably be expected to
139A friend was on a trip in the eastern part of Turkey
when he happened to see a hoca teaching a small Quran class
in the courtyard of a mosque. ' He asked the boys what they
were learning, and they replied they were memorizing parts
of the Ouran^and recited for him. He asked what the passage
they had recited meant and none could tell him. He then
asked the hoca the same question and he, too, could not an-
swer except to say it was written in the Quran and therefore
was holy. Discussion with V. Varhos, Monterey, CA. , Sep, 1979
(event occurred in early 1970's). Cf. Sterling, Village , p. 275
The religious textbooks currently in use in Turkish schools,
while being basically accurate, add a certain nationalistic
flavor (ie: protecting the nation's natural resources, etc.)
See Dirks, Islam, pp. 144-167 for some of the subjects.
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lapse. This lapse probably would have been quite minor how-
ever, if strict adherence had been the rule under the Ottomans.
But throughout Turkey over the years, various aberrations had
been commonplace.
Turkey has, of course, abounded with a variety of reli-
gious teachers over the centuries. The Dervish orders were
a modification of orthodox Islam designed for popular con-
sumption. The largely illiterate Turkish population of
Ottoman and earlier times flocked to the Dervish Tarikats
which naturally grew strong with increased numbers. The
common people turned to the Tarikats for leadership and
discipline in their religious lives.
The Dervish orders were not immediately attacked by
Ataturk, but after the Kurdish/Dervish revolt of 19 25, he
140
acted quickly and on 2 Sep 19 25, the Tarikats were disbanded.
In Turkey today the Mevleve sect is still represented in the
form of the Mevlana Mosque in Konya (now a museum) and the
Whirling Dervishes who perform worldwide. Other Dervish
sects, while still banned, are known to have operated as
recently as 1975; and in 19 72, five deputies in Parliament
were purported to be Suleymancilar
.
Lewis, Emergence, np. 404-442.
141Dirks, Islam
, pp. 168-177. Mansur was also able to
point to a considerable contribution of Bektasi ceremony to
the religious life of Bodrum in 19 69, although they were
sometimes ascribed solely to orthodox Islam. Mansur, Bodrum ,
pp. 101, 108, 110.
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In Turkey, as in much of the Middle East, women have
long been treated in accordance with local tradition; but
almost invariably, the treatment is attributed to Islam.
In Erzurum, the great majority of women seen on the city
streets are among the most covered in the Moslem world.
They are covered from head to toe with a one-piece cloth
garment. Whereas in most places where the veil is in use,
the eyes are left uncovered, In Erzurum such is not the case,
Many of the women are guided by young children as if they
were blind— those without such guides are able to cross the
streets only with great luck.
Asked why the women were so covered, one man replied,
"It is a penalty for their sins." Another stated it was a
142 -
requirement of Islam. According to Abu Dawud Sulaiman,
Muhammad indicated that the face and hands could remain
uncovered after a woman reached puberty, and nowhere in the
Quran is there a requirement for a woman to be completely
, 143
covered.
The matter of inheritance is reasonably clearly spelled
144
out in the Quran and Hadith. Women have an appointed
This dress and these comments as to its justification
were common in the Erzurum-Erzincan-Gumushane area. 8-14
June, 19 80.
143Abu Dawud Sulaiman, Hadith 31: 30, cited in Maulana
Muhammad Ali, The Holy Quran , 6th ed. (Chicago: Specialty
Promotions, 1973), notes 1751 and 1751a.
144Quran IV: 7-12 and 177.
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share equal to half a man's. In Turkish village life, women
have been effectively disinherited in many cases.
In the early 19 50 's, women in some central Anatolian
villages generally inherited nothing. Sterling, who gives
several samples, states about a daughter's inheritance, "I
never heard of this provision having been applied nor ever
145
seriously suggested."
Another point is that of divorce. The Quran provides
women the right to request divorce, but when Republican
Turkey granted this right to women, it was considered a
146great innovation.
A last point where Folk Islam is in evidence in Turkey
is superstition. Charms to ward off the 'evil eye' ( nazar )
147
are everywhere in evidence. Houses and small businesses
throughout the country have blue windows and doors to guard
against nazar. This includes not only the remote villages
145Sterling, Village
, p. 122.
146Quran II: 229. Cf. Ruth Frances Woodsmall, Women
and the New East (Washington: Middle East Institute, 19 60)
,
p. 3, and Nermin Abadan-Unat, "The Modernization of Turkish
Women," Middle East Journal vol. 32 no. 3 (Summer 1978), pp.
291-296.
T A "7
Upon renting an apartment in Istanbul, our neighbors
(dentists, merchants, and military) presented us with no
fewer than six charms to keep away the nazar.
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of central and eastern Anatolia, but modern apartment
buildings in the west as well.
Folk Islam is deeply rooted in Turkey's history, pri-
marily in the form of the Dervish orders. The primary dif-
ference in these deviations from orthodox Islam as compared
to those mentioned earlier lies in the fact of belief by
the people that these practices are actually a part of their
Sunni faith, whereas the smokers and drinkers have made a
conscious choice to ignore Islamic edicts.
C . SUMMARY
This section has dealt briefly with the influence of
Islam on the individual. Although Ataturk's secularizing
reforms have been in effect for a half century, not only has
Islam not been effectively eliminated from Turkish political
life, it has scarcely been touched in the private realm.
No attempt was made to legislate the spirit of Islam
out of private lives—only its open manifestation. The
various reforms did serve to reduce the average Turk's know-
ledge of the intricacies of his faith—and to some extent
the more basic parts of it. The alphabet reform and removal
148
In small Anatolian villages it is not unusual to find
nothing painted except the mosque and the doors and windows
of the other buildings— these invariably blue. It is equally
common to see new apartment buildings with unpainted walls
being 'protected' by blue window and door frames. Cf.
Szyliowicz, Erdemli




of Arabic from the schools cut at least one entire genera-
tion off from any first-hand knowledge of Quranic teachings.
This inability to study his religion on his own has left
the Turk—especially the peasant Turk—at the mercy of what-
ever charlatan happens his way. This, in turn, has left
Turkish Islam with a folk flavor of some disparity with
orthodox Sunni Islam.
Despite this, the average Turk knows he is a Muslim. He
will generally state he is a Sunni; but whatever he says,






Islam is indeed a force in Turkey today. It is no longer
the legitimizing force for the state as it was under the
early Ottomans, nor is it a political force readily identi-
fiable with a powerful religious elite. Islam in Turkey
today is more nearly a subliminal cultural force governing
many of the average Turk's day-to-day interpersonal actions.
The secularizing reforms of Ataturk were designed to put
an end to the public religious displays which for so many
centuries had linked Islam to the state. But the influence
of these same centuries' learning at mother's knee the
proper way to be a Muslim adult were not and probably could
not have been changed.
The overwhelming majority of today's Turks are, at least
nominally, Sunni Muslims. The rural Turks tend to be more
devout than the urbanites, but the basis for their faith is
the same. From a strictly interpreted Sunni viewpoint, most
Turks would not qualify as very good Muslims—much traditional
superstition has been retained in their religion as prac-
ticed in much of the countryside. Ataturk can be accredited
with some of this by having cut off the people from formal




The process of modernization has accounted for as much
personal secularization (probably more) as the many legis-
lated attempts. Improvement in living conditions and
communications have produced a desire in the average Turk to
further improve his lot in life physically . His belief
that being a Muslim is enough to get him to heaven with or
without total devotion is enough to cause metaphysics to be
left to others. The Turk knows he is a Muslim and that Islam
is good— for him, that is enough.
The 'revival' of Islam in Turkish public life was in two
phases: the multi-party era when votes were being sought;
and the mid-1970's to the present when the object has often
been oil. This has been a revival of expediency, but it
has underscored the basic fact: Turkey is a nation of
Muslims.
The cultural influence of Islam in Turkey is still great
and will remain so for generations to come; but what is
probably an irreversible process of secularization-by-
modernization is well underway. Islam is still important.
To be a Turk implies being a Muslim. Many identify quite
closely with the remainder of the Muslim World. Still, a
higher standard of living and wordly goods have taken over
as goals for many Turks today. This notwithstanding,
Islamic precepts still govern many of the interpersonal
relationships of Turks today—especailly the poor.
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Islam is not an open political force in Turkey today.
It is implied rather than stated; sensed rather than seen
in virtually every act. As such, it subconsciously governs
the actions of individual Turks and through them very subtly
permeates every aspect of Turkish life, and consequently,





ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROMULGATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 19 61
On 27 May I9 60, the Committee of National Unity assumed
control of the government of Turkey in order to relieve the
nation from the excesses of the Democratic Party. In order
to preclude the recurrence of these excesses upon the return
of the government to civilian rule, certain weaknesses in
the Constitution of 19 24 demanded correction. The method
devised for correcting these faults was that of drafting an
entirely new constitution.
The vehicle for that drafting was the Constitutional
Commission consisting of ten professors from the faculties
of the Universities of Istanbul and Ankara. Their work was
completed and presented to the CNU on 15 October 19 60. There
was a second draft prepared independently by the Adminis-
trative Sciences Institute of the Faculty of Political
Sciences of Ankara University, and it was duely considered
along with the former.
The next step in the process was the forming of the
Constituent Assembly composed of representatives of the
following groups:
a) Representatives elected by the Head of




1 The Head of State
2 The Committee of National Unity
b) Members of the Council of Ministers
c) Representatives of the Provinces
d) Representatives of the Political Parties:
1 The Republican People's Party
2 The Republican Peasant Nation Party
e) Representatives of other organizations and
associations:
1 Representatives of the Bars
2 Representatives of the Press
3 Representatives of the Association
of Veterans
4 Representatives of the Association of
Tradesmen and Craftsmen
5 Representatives of Youth
6 Representatives of the Labor Unions
7 Representatives of the Chambers
8 Representatives of the Teachers'
Organizations
9 Representatives of the Agricultural
Organizations
10 Representatives of the University
11 Representatives of the Judicial Organs
This Constituent Assembly had the dual charge of discus-
sing and accepting the new constitution as well as preparing
a new electoral law. Requirements within the Assembly for
acceptance of both documents were set at two- thirds majority,
and both the Assembly and the CNU were given the right of a
single veto in specific points— if agreement was not reached,
a mixed commission was to be formed to settle individual
points of dispute.
The Constitutent Assembly convened on 6 January 19 61 and
three days later elected from its membership twenty persons
to serve as the Constitutional Commission of the Assembly
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of Representatives under the chairmanship of Enver Ziya
Karal. This Commission considered both available drafts from
10 January until presenting its draft to the Assembly on
9 March 1961. Debate in the Assembly and CNU went from
30 March until 27 May 19 61 when the new Constitution was
accepted by votes of 22-0 in the CNU and 238-0 (with thirty-
two abstentions) in the Assembly.
The final phase of this process was the popular vote of
9 July 19 61. The results were:
...the total number of eligible voters in Turkey was
12.735.009, and a total number of 10.322.169 voters
cast their ballots. Of these, 10.282.561 ballots
were valid and 39.608 were invalid. The number of
those voting for the Constitution totaled 6.348.191
and those against it 3.9 34.370.
The Constitution of 19 61 was put into effect on 20 July
1961.




ARTICLE 19 OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION
Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dic-
tates of his conscience, to choose his own religious faith
and to have his own opinions.
Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites
are free provided they are not in opposition to public order,
or morals or to the laws enacted to uphold them.
No person shall be compelled to worship, or participate
in religious ceremonies and rites, or to reveal his religious
faith and belief. No person shall be reproached for his
religious faith and belief.
Religious education and teaching shall be subject to
the individual's own will and volition, and in the case
of minors, to their legally appointed guardians.
No person shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion
or religious feelings or things considered sacred by religion
in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of political or
personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even partially
basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal
order of the State on religious dogmas. Those who violate
this prohibition, or those who induce others to do so shall
be punishable under the pertinent laws. In the case of
associations and political parties the former shall be perm-
anently closed down by order of authorized courts and the
latter by order of the Constitutional Court.
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